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Abstract
An oft-defended claim of a close relationship between Gentzen infer-
ence rules and the meaning of the connectives they introduce and elimi-
nate has given rise to a whole domain called proof-theoretic semantics, see
Schroeder-Heister (1991); Prawitz (2006). A branch of proof-theoretic se-
mantics, mainly developed by Dosˇen (2019); Dosˇen and Petrı´c (2011), iso-
lates in a precise mathematical manner formulas (of a logic L) that have
the same meaning. These isomorphic formulas are defined to be those that
behave identically in inferences. The aim of this paper is to investigate
another type of recently discussed rules in the literature, namely ground-
ing rules, and their link to the meaning of the connectives they provide
the grounds for. In particular, by using grounding rules, we will refine
the notion of isomorphic formulas through the notion of hyper-isomorphic
formulas. We will argue that it is actually the notion of hyper-isomorphic
formulas that identify those formulas that have the same meaning.
1 Introduction
In recent years, the notion of grounding – a non-causal explanatory relation
among truths – has been at the centre of a blossoming literature. Much of
the attention has been dedicated to the concept of metaphysical grounding,
but other types of grounding have also emerged. Amongst them, there is the
notion of logical grounding, which is the focus of this paper. Given a certain
logic L, such as classical logic, a logical grounding relation relative to L links
the main connectives of L with their grounds, namely with the formulas that
explain them in a non-causal way. For instance, the grounds of a true classical
conjunction as A ∧B are usually identified with its conjuncts A,B.
The relation of logical grounding has been formalized in three different
ways: as an operator (e.g. see Fine (2012b); Correia (2014)), as a predicate
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(e.g. see Korbmacher (2017)), but also as a meta-linguistic relation (e.g. see
Poggiolesi (2018)). Under the last formalization, logical grounding is seen as a
special sort of inference relation. Indeed, just as for a logic L there are inference
rules of the form
A1, ....An
B
that we can read as “from the premisses A1, ....An we can infer that a certain
conclusion B is true,” there are also grounding rules of the form
C1, ...Cm
D˜
read as: the premissesC1, ...Cm are the grounds for or the reasons why the con-
clusion D is true. Grounding is a strengthening of inference: a grounding rule
not only tells us that a conclusion is true, given that certain premisses are, but
also it identifies the premisses as the reasons why the conclusion is true. In this
respect, inference rules and grounding rules can be seen as formalizations of
the logical aspects of proofs-that and proof-why, respectively (see for example
Poggiolesi (2016); Rumberg (2013)).
Proof-theoretic semantics, a flourishing and thriving domain of research (see
Francez (2015), Schroeder-Heister (2018)), is built on the (Wittgenstein) thesis
that use determines meaning, and that therefore the meaning of logical con-
nectives is determined by their (logical) use in inference rules. In particular,
there exists a branch of proof-theoretic semantics, mainly developed by Dosˇen
(2019); Dosˇen and Petrı´c (2011) and recently taken up by Restall (2019), which
aims at identifying in a precise mathematical manner those formulas of a cer-
tain logic L that have the same meaning according to this conception: that is,
those formulas that behave identically in the inference rules of L. Such formu-
las are called isomorphic formulas of L.
The proof-theoretic semantics literature identifies the meaning of logical
connectives uniquely on the basis of their use in inference. But years of research
on grounding teaches that this is not the only possible use: logical connectives
may also have a role in explanations. In other words, they are not only used
in proofs-that, but they can also be used in proofs-why. If we take seriously
the Wittgenstein maxim that use determines meaning, and recognize the mul-
tiplicity of uses which linguistic expressions can be put to, then use of logical
connectives is also determined by grounding rules, which are a subset of infer-
ence rules. From this, several questions naturally arise: what notion of mean-
ing do we get if we conceive meaning as determined by use in explanations
as well? The same as the one identified by inferences? A different one? And
if so, what is the link between the two? In this paper we will take some steps
towards answering these questions. In particular, by working with grounding
rules we will propose a refinement of the notion of isomorphic formulas that
we call hyper-isomorphic formulas. We will argue that hyper-isomorphic formu-
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las isolate formulas having the same meaning in a clear and very fine-grained
way.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we will illustrate Dosˇen and
Petrı´c’s approach to isomorphic formulas, while in Section 3 we will introduce
Poggiolesi’s approach to grounding rules. Finally, in Section 4, we will isolate
the notion of hyper-isomorphic formulas by combining the two approaches
and we will argue that this notion determines in a fine-grained way whether
two formulas have the same meaning. Section 5 will conclude.
2 Isomorphic formulas in classical logic
The proof-theoretic semantics literature develops the idea that the inference
rules of formal calculi, like natural deduction calculi or sequent calculi, de-
fine the meaning of the connective that they introduce and eliminate (e.g. see
Schroeder-Heister (1991, 2018); Prawitz (2006); Poggiolesi (2010); Tranchini (2019)).
In this context, it follows naturally that A and B have the same meaning in
virtue of their logical connectives when they function in the same manner in
inference rules: that is, when in any derivation one can replace one by the other
and nothing is lost, nor gained. When this holds, A and B are said to be iso-
morphic. Put more formally, the formulas A and B are isomorphic when there
is a derivation f from A to B, and another derivation g from B to A, such that
f composed with g is equal to the identity deduction from A to A, while g com-
posed with f is equal to the identity deduction from B to B. This analysis of
isomorphism presupposes a notion of equality between derivations, or identity
of proofs (e.g. see Dosˇen (2019)), which is one of the main tasks of categorial
proof theory and which is quite long and complex.
In order not to burden the paper, we will not introduce the whole machin-
ery of categorial proof theory, since thanks to the work of Dosˇen and Petrı´c
(2011) it is not required for the presentation. Dosˇen and Petrı´c have indeed con-
structed a formal system S such that, given two formulas A and B, if A↔ B is
provable in S, then A and B behave identically in derivations, namely they are
isomorphic formulas. We now introduce this formal system.
Definition 2.1. Let L be the propositional classical language containing atomic
sentences, p, q, r, ..., the unary connective ¬, as well as the binary connectives
∧,∨, and the parenthesis. Classical formulas are constructed as usual and de-
noted by capital letters A,B,C, ...; the symbols→ and↔ are defined by means
of the other connectives.
Definition 2.2. Let S be the formal system composed by the following axioms:
A↔ A
¬¬A↔ A
(A ∧B) ∧ C ↔ A ∧ (B ∧ C) (A ∨B) ∨ C ↔ A ∨ (B ∨ C)
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(A ∧B)↔ (B ∧A) (A ∨B)↔ (B ∨A)
¬(A ∧B)↔ (¬A ∨ ¬B) ¬(A ∨B)↔ (¬A ∧ ¬B)
as well as by the following inference rules
A↔ B
¬A↔ ¬B
A↔ B
B ↔ A
A↔ B B ↔ C
A↔ C
A↔ B C ↔ D
(A ∧ C)↔ (B ∧D)
A↔ B C ↔ D
(A ∨ C)↔ (B ∨D)
Proposition 2.3. The formulas A and B are isomorphic (in a permutational perfectly
generalizable category) if, and only if, A↔ B is a theorem of S.
Proof. See (Dosˇen and Petrı´c, 2011, p.5)
3 Grounding rules for classical logic
A branch of the recent literature on grounding conceives grounding as a special
case of inference (see Poggiolesi (2018)). So, for given a logic L, beyond the
valid inferences of L, one may also enquire as to the (correct) grounding rules
of L. In order to be more specific about this notion of grounding, we now
introduce Poggiolesi’s grounding rules for classical logic. We introduce these
rules in a form which is slightly different from that of Poggiolesi but more
useful for our purposes.1
Definition 3.1. Let D be a formula of the classical propositional language L.
The converse of D, written D∗, is defined in the following way
D∗ =
{ ¬n−1E, if D = ¬nE and n is odd
¬n+1E, if D = ¬nE and n is even
where the principal connective of E is not a negation, n > 0 and 0 is taken to
be an even number.
Let us provide some examples that help to clarify Definition 3.1. If D =
¬¬¬¬p, then its converse, D∗, is ¬¬¬¬¬p. If D = ¬(A ∧ B), then its converse,
D∗, is (A ∧B); finally, if D = (A ∨B), then its converse, D∗, is ¬(A ∨B). From
1Poggiolesi’s calculus has only one rule for negation. But since the rule is quite laborious to
present, we skip the presentation here and present several instances of this rule here.
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now on we will use capital letters to refer to formulas of the language L and
their converse.
Definition 3.2. Given A and B of the language L, we say that A is a-c equiv to
B if, and only if, in the classical natural deduction calculus it can be proved
that A is equivalent to B by associativity and commutativity of conjunction
and disjunction.
Let us provide some exemples of formulas A and B such that A is a-c equiv
to B. A ∧ (B ∧C) is a-c equiv to C ∧ (A ∧B). ¬((E ∨ F ) ∧ (G ∧ (H ∨D))) is a-c
equiv to ¬((F ∨ E) ∧ (G ∧ (D ∨H))), but also to ¬((G ∧ (D ∨H)) ∧ (F ∨ E)).
A ∧ ((B ∨ C) ∨ (D ∨ E)) is a-c equiv to A ∧ ((D ∨B) ∨ (E ∨ C)).
Definition 3.3. Given a formula A of the language L, let AC(A) be the set of all
elements B such that A is a-c equiv to B (Definition 3.2). From now on we will
useA,B,C, ... to denote generic elements belonging to the set AC(A), AC(B),
AC(C), ... respectively.
Definition 3.4. Let A be a generic element belonging to the set AC(A). Then
A∗ denotes generic elements of AC(A∗).
Let us illustrate our notation with some examples. Consider a formula A of
the language L, which has the form ¬((p ∧ q) ∨ r), then
A denotes any of the following formulas: ¬((p ∧ q) ∨ r), ¬((q ∧ p) ∨ r), ¬(r ∨
(p ∧ q)), ¬(r ∨ (q ∧ p))
A∗ denotes any of the following formulas: (p ∧ q) ∨ r, (q ∧ p) ∨ r, r ∨ (p ∧ q),
r ∨ (q ∧ p)
From now on, capital letters in bold will be used to refer to bothA,B,C, ...
but alsoA∗, B∗, C∗, . . . M,N, ... will be multisets of capital letters in bold.
We now have all the elements to introduce Poggiolesi’s grounding rules,2
which are the following:3
A
¬˜¬A
A,B
A˜ ∧B
A∗,B∗
˜¬(A ∨B)
A, B
A˜ ∨B
[B∗] A
A˜ ∨B
[A∗] B
A˜ ∨B
A∗, B∗
˜¬(A ∧B)
[B] A∗
˜¬(A ∧B)
[A] B∗
˜¬(A ∧B)
2See Poggiolesi (2018) for a detailed description of the calculus.
3All rules carry the proviso that their premisses are consistent.
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Each of these rules provide the grounds of the classical connectives of nega-
tion, conjunction and disjunction. So A,B are the grounds (complete4 and im-
mediate) of A ∧ B, but also of A ∨ B; whilst A is the ground (complete and
immediate) of ¬¬A. Note that according to these rules, formulas which are
equivalent by associativity and commutativity of conjunction and disjunction
(i.e. ac-equiv formulas) have the same grounds. This feature is taken into ac-
count by the special bold notation. So not only A,B are the grounds (complete
and immediate) of A ∧ B, and A ∨ B, but they are also the grounds of B ∧ A
and B ∨A. Note that differently from the grounding rules put forward by Fine
(2012a); Correia (2014); Schnieder (2011), the grounding rules of Poggiolesi in-
volves a distinction between grounds and robust conditions, which can be seen
as a solution to the problem of the overdetermination of disjunction (e.g. see
Mac Sweneey (2019)). It can be described briefly on the example of a disjunc-
tion like A ∨ B, in a situation where the formula A is true. In this case, A is
certainly a ground for A∨B. However, in order for it to be the complete ground
for A ∨B, it also needs to be the case that B is not also a ground for A ∨B, i.e.
that ¬B is true. In other words, it is the truth of ¬B that ensures that, or is a
(robust) condition for A to be the complete ground of A∨B. Thus, A is the com-
plete and immediate formal ground for A ∨ B under the robust condition that
¬B is true. The reader is referred to Poggiolesi (2018) for a detailed explanation
and discussion of the idea of robust conditions in a grounding framework. In
the rules above, robust conditions are denoted by square brackets; they play a
role in disjunction as well as in negation of conjunction.
Definition 3.5. A grounding tree is a tree such that each of its nodes is obtained
from the parent-node(s) by application of one of the grounding rules. At the
root of the tree we find the conclusion.
4 Grounding and hyper-isomorphism
We now bring together the proof-theoretic tradition represented by the work
of Dosˇen and Petrı´c (2011) with the ground-theoretic tradition exemplified by
the grounding rules of Poggiolesi. As already explained, the aim is to study
the relation between grounding rules and the meaning of the constants they
provide the grounds for. In particular, we want to further analyse the question
of synonymy in logic through grounding rules. To this end, let us start by not-
ing that to determine whether two formulas A and B have the same meaning
in the proof-theoretic semantics perspective, we need to establish whether A
and B behave identically in derivations. To establish whether A and B behave
identically in derivations we need a notion of identity of proofs (which is quite
laborious) since derivations can be constructed by means of introduction and
4The grounding rules proposed by Poggiolesi aim at capturing the notion of complete and imme-
diate logical grounding, where the complete grounds of a truth B are, roughly, a maximal set of all
truths that may groundB. Therefore note that the notion of complete ground is different from that
of full ground used by Fine (2012a); Correia (2014); Schnieder (2011). For a comparison between
the notions of full and complete grounding, see Poggiolesi (2020).
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elimination rules. The situation is not so complicated in case of grounding.
Since all grounding rules are introduction rules, to determine whether two for-
mulas behave identically in grounding trees, we will need to check whether
they are grounded by the same multisets of formulas. As we will show in
Proposition 4.2, when two formulas A and B can be grounded by the same
multisets of formulas, not only they trivially have the same grounds but also
they ground the same formulas. Therefore, one can replace one by the other in
a grounding tree and nothing is lost, nor gained.
Definition 4.1. For any formula A, we denote by G(A) the set of all multisets
of formulas that form withA one of our grounding rules. For any two formulas
A and B of the language L, when G(A) = G(B) we say that A and B are in the
relation .=, i.e. A .= B.
For the sake of clarity, let us give an example of the notationG(A), as well as
of the relation .=. Consider the formula p∨q, G(p∨q) = ({p, q}, {p∗, q}, {q, p∗}).
Consider the formulas p∧q and q∧p; G(p∧q) = ({p, q}) andG(q∧p) = ({p, q}),
so p ∧ q .= q ∧ p.
Proposition 4.2. For any two formulas A and B, if A .= B and D is the conclusion
of an application of a grounding rule having as premise A and potentially an auxiliary
formula C, then D is also the conclusion of an application of the same grounding rule
having as premise B and the same auxiliary formula C.
Proof. By inspection of cases.
Definition 4.3. Let S′ be the formal system composed by the following axioms:
A↔ A
(A ∧B) ∧ C ↔ A ∧ (B ∧ C) (A ∨B) ∨ C ↔ A ∨ (B ∨ C)
(A ∧B)↔ (B ∧A) (A ∨B)↔ (B ∨A)
¬(A ∧B)↔ (A∗ ∨B∗) ¬(A ∨B)↔ (A∗ ∧B∗)
as well as by the following inference rules
A↔ B
A∗ ↔ B∗
A↔ B
B ↔ A
A↔ B B ↔ C
A↔ C
A↔ B C ↔ D
(A ∧ C)↔ (B ∧D)
A↔ B C ↔ D
(A ∨ C)↔ (B ∨D)
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Proposition 4.4. The formulas A and B are in the relation .= if, and only if, A↔ B
is a theorem of S′.
Proof. By a simple inspection of cases.
Let us compare the two formal systems S and S′.
Theorem 4.5. For any two formulas A and B, we have that if A↔ B is a theorem of
S′, then A↔ B is a theorem of S. The converse does not hold.
Proof. Let us show first that if A ↔ B is a theorem of S, then it needs not be a
theorem of S′. TakeA↔ B to be the equivalence p↔ ¬¬p. It is straightforward
to see that p↔ ¬¬p is provable in S, since it is an instance of one of its axioms,
whilst it is not provable in S′.
In order to show that for any two formulas A and B, if A↔ B is a theorem
of S′, then A ↔ B is a theorem of S, we need to show that any axiom and
inference rule of the system S′ is also an axiom and inference rule of the system
S. This is so by a simple inspection of cases. The only exception is represented
by the axioms ¬(A∧B)↔ (A∗ ∨B∗), ¬(A∨B)↔ (A∗ ∧B∗) and the inference
rule
A↔ B
A∗ ↔ B∗
However these case can easily be recovered by the use of the axiom A↔ ¬¬A,
the transitivity rule and the rule
A↔ B
¬A↔ ¬B
We call two formulas A and B such that A ↔ B is a theorem of S′ hyper-
isomorphic formulas. Hyper-isomorphic formulas have been obtained by the
same methodology used to define isomorphism, but by employing grounding
rules instead of inference rules. In principle the set of hyper-isomorphic for-
mulas could have been completely different from that of isomorphic formulas
and this would have raised difficulties on the links between the two. But this is
not so. Although the relations of isomorphism and hyper-isomorphism do not
coincide, since it is not the case that any theorem of S is a theorem of S′, they
however are in a precise relation between each other: the latter is more restric-
tive than the former. But this involves that meaning as determined by use in
explanations is more refined than meaning as determined by use in inferences.
Such a result was to be expected: every explanation is an inference, but not vice
versa, and hence two formulas could have the same role in inferences, whilst
not behaving in the same way as far as explanation is concerned. Hence, if we
take use of formulas in logic to include their use in explanations, we get a more
fine-grained notion of formulas having the same meaning.
To illustrate this, consider the example of p and ¬¬p which are isomorphic,
but not hyper-isomorphic. While p and ¬¬p play the same role in inferences,
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they do not have the same role in explanations since p grounds or explains ¬¬p,
but not vice-versa. From the point of view of explanation, it seems clear that p
and ¬¬p do not have the same meaning since p (strictly) grounds or explains
¬¬p and it would be strange for a formula to explain another with the same
meaning. Therefore, this is a case where meaning as use in inferences misses
differences which are important for use in explanations and hence the latter is
to be preferred to the former.
Note that this conclusion is corroborated by technical considerations. In-
deed if we compare the way in which isomorphic and hyper-isomorphic for-
mulas are obtained, we observe the following: whilst in the former case a heavy
logical machinery (establishing identity of proofs) has been developed, in the
latter case simple consideration of the grounding relations is sufficient. In other
words, whilst grounding rules do the job on their own, inference rules don’t;
this may be because grounding rules incorporate sufficient machinery to isolate
meaning in a more fine-grained way. In this respect note that as isomorphism
has been recently used (see Restall (2019)) to contribute to the debate on hy-
perintensionality in logic (e.g. see Leitgeb (2019)) from a proof-theoretical per-
spective, the same could be done in future research with hyper-isomorphism:
the simplicity by means of which grounding rules isolate hyper-isomorphic
formulas gives reasons to expect several new results.
Let us also underline the following important aspect. In the grounding lit-
erature there exists a distinction which is often quoted and discussed (e.g. see
Correia (2010) and Correia (2016); Fine (2017)), namely the distinction between
the worldly content of a formula A and the representational content of A. The
worldly content of A corresponds to the bit of reality that A describes, whilst
the representational content of A corresponds to the representation of reality
that A describes. Two formulas B,C are said to be synonymous, or to have
the same meaning, when they have the same representational content. As Cor-
reia (2016) emphasizes, synonymy is a subtle relation: so for example the two
statements ’Hesperus is Phosphorus’ and ’Hesperus is Hesperus’ are not syn-
onymous, but also the following two ’The Mediterranean Sea contains water’
and ’The Mediterranean Sea contains a substance composed of H2O molecules’
are not.
The grounding relation is sensitive to the distinction between worldly and
representational content of a statement. On a worldly conception of logical
grounding, grounding is a relation between factual content of formulas whilst
on a representational conception of grounding, grounding is a relation between
representational contents of formulas. Again we can illustrate the distinction
on particular cases. On a representational conception of logical grounding, A
is taken to ground the truths A ∧ A, A ∨ A while on a worldly conception A
cannot possibly ground any of these, since they are the same as A under this
conception.
Poggiolesi’s account of grounding is explicitly representational (as are most
of the formal accounts, e.g. see Fine (2012a) and Schnieder (2011)): grounding
rules are supposed to convey grounding relations amongst representational
contents of formulas. Hence if two formulas have the same multisets of com-
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plete and immediate grounds, these two formulas have the same represen-
tational content, for the very same conception these rules belong to. Hyper-
isomorphic formulas are formulas that have the same grounding relations,
hence hyper-isomorphic formulas are formulas that have the same represen-
tational content or meaning. This is fully coherent with our conclusion.
5 Conclusions
The central assumption of proof-theoretic semantics is that, since meaning is
determined by use, the meaning of logical connectives is determined by their
use in inference rules. However, when proof-theoretic semantics was first de-
veloped, inference rules were the only proof rules available on the market. In
recent years another type of rule has slowly emerged, namely grounding rules,
rules whose premises not only show that a conclusion is true, but represent
the reasons why it is true. Motivated by the observation that logical connec-
tives are used not only in inferences but also in explanations, this paper has
studied the consequences for meaning under a ground-theoretic perspective.
Using grounding rules to identify when two formulas have the same meaning,
we have developed the notion of hyper-isomorphism, which is a refinement of
the existing notion of isomorphism. It thus seems suitable to reflect identity of
meaning as concerns use in both inference and explanation.This result should
be seen as opening a wide range of new and unexplored issues that cannot but
change and enlarge the agenda of ground-theoretic, as well as proof-theoretic
scholars.
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